The Hague Service Convention as Enabler: \u3cem\u3eVolkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk\u3c/em\u3e by Cocanougher, Elizabeth L.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
10-1-1988
The Hague Service Convention as Enabler:
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk
Elizabeth L. Cocanougher
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth L. Cocanougher, The Hague Service Convention as Enabler: Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 20 U. Miami Inter-
Am. L. Rev. 175 (1988)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol20/iss1/7
175
THE HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION AS
ENABLER: VOLKSWAGENWERK
AKTIENGESELLSCHAF T V. SCHLUNK
I. INTRODUCTION 175
II. THE HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION 179
A. Background 179
B. Notification au Parquet 181
III. AMERICAN PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS OVER FOREIGN
DEFENDANTS 182
A. Due Process 182
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 183
C. Common Law 185
D. Long-Arm Statutes 186
E. The Supremacy Clause 186
IV. A TREATY PRE-EMPTED BY THE LAW OF THE FORUM STATE 188
A. The Court's Reasoning 188
B. The Solicitor General's Amicus Brief 190
C. The Concurrence 192
V. THE IMPAIRED FORCE OF THE CONVENTION 193
VI. CONCLUSION 197
I. INTRODUCTION
When a plaintiff files suit in a United States court against a
foreign defendant, service of process is a relatively painless proce-
dure if that country is a party, as is the United States, to the
Hague Service Convention.' Prior to the Convention, plaintiffs who
1. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1896, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163,
[hereinafter Hague Service Convention). In addition to the United States, the following
countries are party to the Convention: Antigua and Barbuda; Barbados; Belgium; Botswana;
Cyprus; Czechoslovakia; Denmark; Egypt; Fiji; Finland; France; Greece; Israel; Italy; Japan;
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attempted to serve process abroad often found themselves em-
broiled in "procedural chaos." 2 The motivating force behind the
Convention's formulation in 1964 was a desire to alleviate these
procedural problems.3 Pursuant to the Convention, each party es-
tablishes a central authority in conformity with its own law. This
central authority acts to ensure that all service abroad was handled
both efficiently and expeditiously.
4
Although the Convention's plan is generally considered relia-
ble,5 confusion arose regarding the interplay between the Conven-
tion and the law of forum states. United States courts6 have
reached opposite results in determining whether the Convention
allows a party to serve process on a foreign corporation through its
wholly-owned and closely-controlled American subsidiary as invol-
untary agent, thereby circumventing the foreign country's central
authority.7 The Supreme Court of the United States resolved that
issue recently in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk.5
Herwig Schlunk brought suit against Volkswagenwerk Aktien-
gesellschaft (VWAG) after his parents were killed in an automobile
collision.9 He first filed a wrongful death action in an Illinois state
court against Volkswagen of America, Inc. (VWoA), alleging de-
fects in the car his parents were driving.10 Schlunk amended his
complaint to allege design defects and joined VWAG, a West Ger-
Kiribati; Luxembourg; Malawi; the Netherlands; Nevis; Norway; Portugal; Seychelles;
Spain; St. Kitts; St. Lucia; St. Vincent; Sweden; Turkey; and the United Kingdom. Id.
2. See Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for
Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 23-54.
4. For a discussion of the central authority procedure, see infra text accompanying
notes 28-33.
5. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Volkswa-
genwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988) (No. 86-1052)[hereinafter
United States Amicus Brief].
6. No contracting nation other than the United States has permitted substituted ser-
vice on a foreign corporation in circumvention of the Convention. See Reply Brief for the
Petitioner at 13, Schlunk (No. 86-1052)[hereinafter Petitioner's Reply Brief].
7. For a description of lower court opinions concerning this issue, see infra note 20 and
accompanying text.
8. 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988).
9. The accident occurred on December 17, 1983, in Cook County, Illinois. Schlunk v.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 145 Ill. App. 3d 594, 595, 495 N.E.2d 1114, 1115 (1986),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988). Schlunk also alleged that
the driver of the other car was negligent and subsequently obtained a default judgment
against him. Id. at 595, 495 N.E.2d at 1114-15.
10. Schlunk first served VWoA through its registered agent for service of process in
Illinois, C.T. Corporation System. VWoA answered, denying that it had designed or manu-
factured the car. Id. at 595, 495 N.E.2d at 1114-15.
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man corporation that had designed and manufactured the car. 1
Schlunk then attempted to serve the amended complaint on
VWAG through VWoA as VWAG's agent."
VWAG filed a special and limited appearance, moving to
quash service on the ground that service was not in compliance
with the Hague Service Convention.'" The Illinois circuit court de-
nied the motion. 14 In a written opinion, the court reasoned that
because VWoA and VWAG are so closely related, VWoA is
VWAG's agent for service of process as a matter of law, notwith-
standing the absence of a formal appointment. 5 The court con-
cluded that because service satisfied state law requirements,'" the
11. Id. VWoA is VWAG's exclusive importer and distributor in the United States.
12. Id. An alias summons was issued to C.T. Corporation System.
13. VWAG submitted an affidavit supporting its motion from the manager and product
liaison of VWoA. VWAG asserted that VWoA is an independent corporation which operates
as agent for VWAG only to receive notices under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act (15 U.S.C. § 1399(e) (1982)).
14. 145 Ill. App. 3d at 595, 495 N.E.2d at 1115.
15. Id. at 596, 496 N.E.2d at 1115. The circuit court found:
1. VWoA is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in
Michigan and registered to do business in Illinois***.
2. VWAG has not appointed VWoA as its agent for service of process in common
law actions brought against it in Illinois or any other state***.
3. VWoA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of VWAG, a majority of the members of
the board of directors of VWoA are members of the board of management of
VWAG, and VWoA is the exclusive importer and distributor of VWAG products
sold in the United States pursuant to a manufacturer-importer agreement en-
tered into between VWAG and VWoA.
Id. at 595-96, 495 N.E.2d at 1115.
16. A corporation is subject to Illinois long-arm reach for jurisdictional purposes if it
transacts "any business" within the state. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-209(1)(1985). The
claim must also be related to the act giving rise to jurisdiction. 145 Ill. App. 3d at 600, 495
N.E.2d at 1118 (citing People v. Parsons Co., 122 II. App. 3d 590, 597, 461 N.E.2d 658, 664
(1984)). Schlunk did not rely on the "transaction of business" basis for jurisdiction. 145 Ill.
App. 3d at 600, 495 N.E. 2d at 1118. Apart from the long-arm requirements, a corporation
may also be subject to jurisdiction if it is "doing business" in Illinois. Id. VWAG did not
contest the authority of Illinois courts to consider the claims; rather, it contested the ade-
qucy of service of process. Id.
To be subject to notice, and the personal jurisdiction of the courts, Illinois mandates
two conditions: (1) the defendant must have conducted sufficient activity within the state,
and (2) the defendant must be served with process pursuant to Illinois law. Id. at 600, 495
N.E.2d at 1118. The question of whether the parent company was doing business in the
state usually depends on the "relationship between the parent and the subsidiary." Id. at
600-01, 495 N.E.2d at 1118. The Illinois appellate court held that because VWoA "is wholly
owned by its parent, and exists predominantly to promote the sale and distribution of its
parent's products in this country," VWoA is an involuntary agent for service of process of
VWAG. Id. at 606, 495 N.E.2d at 1122. The court concluded that VWoA satisfied those
requirements for service on VWAG and therefore was a reasonable target for service. Id. at
608, 495 N.E.2d at 1123.
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Hague Service Convention did not apply.17 The Appellate Court of
Illinois affirmed the district court's decision."1 Because lower
courts have split over the issue,"' the Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorori. 20 The Court unanimously affirmed the
Appellate Court of Illinois decision, holding that the Hague Service
Convention does not apply when a foreign corporation is served
with process through a domestic subsidiary which qualifies as the
corporation's involuntary agent for service under the state law.2"
This Comment will examine the Hague Service Convention
from the perspective of its primary goal of reducing the practical
difficulties of serving process abroad. Part II will review briefly the
substantive and procedual aspects of the Convention. Part III will
focus on the interplay between the Convention's terms and the
United States due process constraints, and Part IV will analyze the
reasoning in the Supreme Court's decision to allow state law to
take priority over the Convention. The Comment will also discuss
the anticipated impact of this decision on the future effectiveness
of the Convention. The Comment concludes with the suggestion
that the Supreme Court's assertion of state law superiority over
the Convention not only damages the Convention but weakens the
United States policy of deference to international treaties.
17. 145 Ill. App. 3d at 596, 495 N.E.2d at 1115.
18. Id. at 594, 495 N.E.2d at 1123. Upon application of VWAG, the circuit court certi-
fied two questions of law to the appellate court: "(1) whether the service in this case violated
the Hague Convention, and (2) whether VWoA and VWAG are so closely related that
VWoA is VWAG's agent for service of process." Id. at 596, 495 N.E.2d at 1115.
The appellate court noted that if service can be made within a state pursuant to state
law, "there is simply no occasion for service abroad"; thus, the Hague Service Convention
does not apply. Id. at 597, 495 N.E.2d at 1116.
19. Lower courts which have disagreed on this issue include: Wingert v. Volkswagen-
werk A.G., Nos. 3:86-2994-16, 3:86-2995-16 (D. S.C. May 19, 1987)(the Hague Service Con-
vention is the exclusive means of serving a foreign corporation); Zisman v. Sieger, 106
F.R.D. 194, 199-200 (N.D. Ill. 1985)(service through a foreign corporation's agent supercedes
the Hague Service Convention); Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Atkiengesellschaft, 104 F.R.D. 95,
97 (S.D. Fla. 1985)(same); Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880, 881
(Ala. 1983)(same); McHugh v. International Components Corp., 118 Misc. 2d 489, 491-92,
461 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167-68 (Sup. Ct. 1983)(same), Cippolla v. Picard Porsche Audi, 496 A.2d
130, 131-32 (R.I. 1985)(the Hague Service Convention is exclusive); Harris v. Browning-Fer-
ris Indus. Chem. Serve., 100 F.R.D. 775, 777-78 (M.D. La. 1984)(same).
For a discussion of a court's application of the agency theory to circumvention of the
Convention through a corporation's subsidiary, see Note, The Hague Service Convention
and Agency Concepts: Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
391 (1987) (authored by Gloria Hoyal).
20. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 108 S. Ct. 26 (1987).
21. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112.
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II. THE HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION
A. Background
The Hague Service Convention was formulated in 1964
through the Hague Conference on Private International Law.2 2 A
multilateral treaty, it was drafted in response to the practical diffi-
culties of serving judicial documents on parties abroad.2 s A
proliferation of cases with international ramifications had created
an urgent need for judicial cooperation in effecting service.2 4 The
Convention sought to simplify, expedite, and ensure service of pro-
cess abroad through a more effective procedure.25 Thirty-two coun-
tries, including the United States and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, have ratified or acceded to the Convention since its
inception. 6
The Convention requires each contracting state to establish a
central authority for receiving and serving process from other
countries.2 7 Upon receiving a service request, the central authority
must ascertain whether it conforms to Convention requirements; if
the request does not comply, the applicant is notified immedi-
22. The treaty was drafted at the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference in 1964, and
revised parts of the Hague Conventions on Civil Procedure of 1905 and 1954. See, e.g.,
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L L., PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE
HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER 1965 ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRA-
JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS (1983); 1 B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL) 118-73 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
23. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
10, Schlunk (No. 86-1052).
24. See Jones, supra note 2, at 534-38; Miller, International Cooperation in Litigation
Between the United States and Switzerland: Unilateral Procedural Accommodation in a
Test Tube, 49 MINN. L. REV. 1069, 1075-86 (1965).
25. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1. The Preamble to the Convention states:
The States signatory to the present convention,
Desiring to create appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial
documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in
sufficient time,
Desiring to improve the organization of mutual judicial assistance for that pur-
pose by simplifying and expediting the procedure,
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect and have agreed upon the
following provisions....
26. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany ratified the Convention in
1967 and 1979, respectively. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent at 2, Schlunk (No. 86-1052). Unlike signatories, they are contracting nations and thus
are bound by the terms of the Convention. Id.
27. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 2, 3.
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ately.2 s If standards are met, the authority then arranges for ser-
vice of the document, either by a method prescribed by the receiv-
ing state's law or by a method requested by the applicant and
compatible with the receiving state's law.2 The Convention also
provides models for certificates of service,"0 exempts certain forms
of service from the Convention and provides strict guidelines for
entering default judgments. 31 Notably, the Convention permits ser-
vice through channels other than the central authority if the two
nations agree on the alternative.32
Through the creation of the central authorities, the Conven-
tion has alleviated some of the practical difficulties of serving pro-
cess abroad where service is governed by inefficient local laws. For
example, some civil law countries, including Germany, have laws
which reflect the notion that service is a governmental function.33
Those countries object to foreign parties serving judicial docu-
ments within their territory, viewing it as an infringement on their
sovereignty. 4 A lack of safeguards for ensuring that process is ac-
tually served compounds the problem.3 5
28. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4.
29. Id. at art. 5.
30. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6.
31. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 8-14, 19. These exceptions have no
direct bearing on the issues here. They include diplomatic and consular exceptions, with the
receiving state's approval (arts. 8, 9); service by post (art. 10(a)); service by and through
judicial officers and officials (art. 10(b), (c)); exceptions by agreement of two or more con-
tracting states (art. 11); payment and reimbursement (art. 12); grounds for refusal of service
by a receiving state (art. 13); settlement of disputes (art. 14); and requirements for a default
(arts. 15, 16). Chapter II of the Convention addresses Extrajudicial Documents and Chapter
III contains general clauses. Id. at chs. II, III.
32. Article 11 provides:
The present Convention shall not prevent two or more contracting states
from agreeing to permit, for the purpose of service of judicial documents, chan-
nels of transmission other than those provided for in the preceeding articles and,
in particular, direct communication between their respective authorities.
Id. at art. 11.
Article 19 further provides:
To the extent that the internal law of a contracting State permits methods
of transmission, other than those provided for in the preceding articles, of docu-
ments coming from abroad, for service within its territory, the present Conven-
tion shall not affect such provisions.
Id. at art. 19.
33. See Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REv.
1031, 1040-43 (1961).
34. Id. at 1041.
35. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 37-43.
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B. Notification au Parquet
The Convention delegates were faced with the problem of
resolving a particularly problematic form of service of process used
by certain civil law countries,36 known as notification au parquet.37
This practice involves serving process on a foreign defendant by
depositing the documents with a local court official in the forum
state."' The official is then expected to route the documents to the
defendants in those states.3 9 Significantly, however, service is con-
sidered effective - and the statute of limitations begins to run -
from the time the documents reach the hands of the routing offi-
cial.4" Defendants often never receive the transmitted documents.' 1
Because countries that use notification au parquet allegedly have
no sanction for failure to transmit the documents, plaintiffs cannot
ensure delivery. 2
The Convention delegates placed two provisions in the agree-
ment that were designed to eliminate notification au parquet.'
8
Specifically, Article 15 prohibits entering a default judgment
against an absent defendant until it is established that: (1) a docu-
ment was served according to the internal law of a foreign state, or
served on the defendant in compliance with the Convention; and
(2) the defendant was given sufficient time to defend."" If a final
judgment is nevertheless entered against an absent defendant, he
may look to Article 16 for relief.4"
Although the default procedures are clearly delineated in the
Convention, their comprehensiveness is diminished if a signatory
to the Convention decides, as did the Supreme Court of the United
36. At the time of the Hague Service Convention, notification au parquet was used by
five countries: France, the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, and Italy. 3 1964 CONFf.RENCE DE
LA HAYE DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVA, AcTEs ET DOCUMENTS DE LA DIXIgME SESSION (No-
TIFICATION) 75 (1964)[hereinafter ACTES ET DOCUMENTS].
37. For a discussion of notification au parquet and related topics see essays compiled
in INTERNATIONAL Co-OPERATION IN LITIGATION: EUROPE (H. Smit ed. 1965).
38. See e.g., id. at 124.
39. Id.
40. S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 12 (1967)(statement of Philip Amram,
member of the United States delegation to the Hague Service Convention)[hereinafter S.
ExEc. REP. No. 6].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 75-77.
44. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, at art. 15.
45. Id. at art. 16. Once a defendant becomes aware of the judgment, he can apply to the
issuing judge for relief.
1988]
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States in Schlunk, that there is no "occasion to transmit" a com-
plaint "for service abroad.""" In other words, safety mechanisms
for default are not mobilized unless service is effected according to
the Convention's terms. If service can be effected through a local
agent, there is no "occasion to transmit"' 7 service abroad and the
Convention does not apply; ineffective service such as notification
au parquet thus may persist.
The Schlunk court did not question the Convention's intent to
eliminate notification au parquet.4 8 However, Schlunk's central is-
sue concerns what VWAG considered a similar situation: a forum
state whose internal law allows a designated person in its territory
to receive service for a foreign party. 9 In a technical sense, that
substituted service does not involve service abroad because it is
"completed" within the forum state.50 Thus, if the Convention is
interpreted technically, a forum's internal law may completely cir-
cumvent the Convention. Because one of the goals of the Conven-
tion was to eliminate notification au parquet, the Court first had
to determine whether the service in Schlunk was analogous to no-
tification au parquet. If the service in Schlunk and notification au
parquet were synonomous, the Schlunk service was not in compli-
ance with the strictures of the Hague Service Convention.
III. AMERICAN PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS ON SERVICE OF PROCESS
ON FOREIGN DEFENDANTS
A. Due Process
The due process clauses of the United States Constitution, the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, set the stage for our country's
concept of basic fairness.0 1 The due process clause of the fifth
amendment mandates that all interested parties to a suit in federal
court must be given reasonable and timely notice.02 Notice must be
46. Id. at art. 1.
47. Id.
48. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2110. But c.f. infra text accompanying notes 99-101 (the
Schlunk court also states it will not resolve the issue of whether the Convention regulates
notification au parquet).
49. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2107.
50. See infra text and accompanying notes 88-98.
51. The Due Process Clause provides in relevant part: "No person shall ... be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
52. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950). In Mul-
lane, the Supreme Court of the United States held that notice by publication was inade-
[Vol. 20:1
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through personal service or be ".... reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions."53 All persons, whether citizens or not, are entitled to this
protection.5 4 Similarly, the fourteenth amendment imposes due
process restraints on the power of state courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction and serve process on residents and non-residents.55
Through judicial interpretation, the due process clause has
evolved into a source of additional restrictions on service of pro-
cess. For a non-resident defendant, limitations focus on the de-
fendant's relationship with the forum state. These restrictions are
enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4,56 state statutes,
5 7
and the common law.
58
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4
A civil claimant who seeks to serve process in federal court
must comply with the procedures set out in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4, which also embraces state law. 9 Congress amended
Rule 4 in 1963 by adding Rule 4(i). This addition specifically pro-
vides for serving process on defendants in foreign countries.6 0 The
quate ". . . not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, but because under the circum-
stances it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other
means at hand." Id. at 319.
53. Id. at 314.
54. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942).
55. The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 63-68.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 75-77.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 69-74.
59. See generally Jarvis & Mellman, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: From Hapless to Hopeless, 61 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1 (1986).
60. 1 B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL) 53-60
(1984).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) provides:
Alternative Provisions for Service in a Foreign Country.
(1) Manner. When the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of
this rule authorizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within
the state in which the district court is held, and service is to be effected upon
the party in a foreign country, it is also sufficient if service of the summons and
complaint is made: (A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign coun-
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rule lists a broad range of acceptable methods of service on defend-
ants who are not in or inhabitants of the forum state."' Signifi-
cantly, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) authorizes service upon a foreign corpo-
ration according to the law of the forum state.2 In addition, Rule
4(e) authorizes service according to statute or court order of either
the United States or the forum state." Thus, in certain circum-
stances, a substituted service of process authorized by state law
may be applied in federal court."
try for service in that country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdic-
tion; or (B) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory,
when service in either case is reasonably calculated to give actual notice; or (C)
upon an individual, by delivery to the individual personally, and upon a corpora-
tion or partnership or association, by delivery to an officer, a managing or gen-
eral agent; or (D) by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be ad-
dressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or (E)
as directed by order of the court. Service under (C) or (E) above may be made
by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age or who is
designated by order of the district court or by the foreign court. On request, the
clerk shall deliver the summons to the plaintiff for transmission to the person or
the foreign court or officer who will make the service.
(2) Return. Proof of service may be made as prescribed by subdivision (g) of
this rule, or by the law of the foreign country, or by order of the court. When
service is made pursuant to subparagraph (1)(D) of this subdivision, proof of
service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of deliv-
ery to the addressee satisfactory to the court.
61. Compliance with Rule 4(e) first requires authorization of service on an out-of-state
party by statute or court order. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i), 4(e). Then service can be effected in
several ways: by law or court order of the foreign country; by personal delivery or mail; or by
order of the forum court. See supra note 56. Although a proposed amendment to Rule 4(i)
would allow "a more flexible means of service in foreign countries, including those permitted
by the Hague Service Convention," the rule, enacted before the Convention, has not been
altered to address it. FED. R. Civ. P. 4, Notes on Amendments and Proposed Amendments
to Federal Rule 4 and Comparative State Provisions, (c) Proposed Amendment to Rule
4(d)(4) and 4(i). Presumably, the more flexible means of service would include service
through central authorities or through exempted service methods as delineated in the
Convention.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i). Rule 4 provides in part:
(c) Service....
(2)(C) A summons and complaint may be served upon a defendant of any
class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) of subdivision (d) of this rule
(i) pursuant to the law of the State in which the district court is held for the
service of summons or other like process upon such defendant in an action
brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that State .
Rule 4(d) provides in part:
Service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person....
(3) Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other
unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name ....
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
64. See, e.g., Note, A Practical Guide to Service of United States Process Abroad, 14
INT'L LAW. 637, 639 (1980)(authored by Gary N. Horlick).
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C. Common Law
When a court attempts to assert in personam jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant on a federal claim, common law interpretation
of the fifth amendment requires only that the forum be fair and
reasonable, that the defendant have notice and that the defendant
have a reasonable opportunity to be heard.6s Thus, federal court
claims are governed by the fifth amendment, Rule 4 notice, and
the defendant's contacts with the forum.
66
State-related claims, 7 however, present a more difficult situa-
tion. A court's assertion of personal jurisdiction - and conse-
quently, valid service - over a foreign defendant in a state-related
claim must meet more stringent tests. Not only must the defend-
ant's presence comply with the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment, but it must also comport with traditional
notions of fundamental fairness.68 The defendant must have cer-
tain minimum contacts with the forum so as not to offend notions
of "fair play and substantial justice."69 Moreover, the defendant
must have "substantial connections" with the forum, purposefully
directing his activities toward that state, before jurisdiction may be
asserted.
7 0
65. See e.g., Stabilisierungsfonds fur Wein v. Kaiserstuhl Wine Distrib. Pty., 647 F.2d
200, 203 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
66. Whether a foreign defendant's contacts must be with the forum state or with the
national forum is uncertain. The U.S. Supreme Court recently stated:
We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court per-
sonal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national con-
tacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which
the federal court sits."
Ashai Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033 n* (1987). See
also Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 293-95 (3rd Cir. 1985); Dejames v.
Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283 (3rd Cir. 1981); Born, Reflections on Judical
Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1987); Lilly, Jurisdiction
Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85, 127-45 (1983).
67. These claims include state-created claims in federal court and claims based on di-
versity in federal court.
68. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
69. Id. The Court later added a test for basic considerations of fairness that weighs the
facts of each case. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92-97 (1978). Although the test was
not clearly delineated, the Court noted that the defendant in Kulko had not visited physical
injury on persons or property within the state. Id. at 96-97. Further, the cause of action did
not arise from the defendant's commercial transactions, but from his personal relations. Id.
at 97. See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
70. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033. See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
474 (1985) ("[Tjhe constitutional touchstone" of the determination whether an exercise of
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D. Long-Arm Statutes
Yet another restriction on a state's ability to acquire personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is the state's own exercise of
self-restraint. A state may choose to limit the reach of its long-arm
statute to less than the extent of its constitutionally protected lim-
its.7" The Illinois Supreme Court, for example, has held that juris-
diction under the Illinois long-arm statute 2 is not coextensive with
the due process clause of the constitution and must be satisfied
independently. 73 These various restrictions, as implemented by
each state, have resulted in a myriad of interpretations of in per-
sonam jurisdiction for state-related claims.
E. The Supremacy Clause
The United States Constitution has conferred power on Con-
gress to enact treaties. Any treaty that Congress enacts overrides
or preempts conflicting state law.7' The Supreme Court of the
personal jurisdiction comports with due process "remains whether the defendant purpose-
fully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State."); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1985) (minimum contacts must have a basis in "some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.").
71. California, for example, retains the full extent of its long-arm power by authorizing
the exercise of jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of the
United States." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
72. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-209 (1985).
73. Green v. Advance Ross Elec. Corp., 86 Ill. 2d 431, 436, 427 N.E.2d 1203, 1206
(1981).
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides that "... all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ...
." The Supreme Court's interpretation of this clause was articulated in Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824):
The appropriate application of that part of the [supremacy] clause which
confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the state
legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but though enacted in the execu-
tion of acknowledged state powers, interfere with, or are contrary to, the laws of
congress, made in pursuance of the constitution, or some treaty made under the
authority of the United States. In every such case, the act of congress, or the
treaty, is supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of
powers not controverted, must yield to it.
Id. at 92-93.
A convention is considered a treaty for purposes of the Supremacy Clause. American
Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1957).
For a discussion of the balancing of the interests of the forum and the foreign state, see
Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence
Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 779-95
(1983).
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United States has held that in order to apply this preemption doc-
trine, it is necessary to first examine congressional intent for each
treaty."' However, even in the absence of any preemptive language
Congress' intent to supersede state law may be inferred.76 With re-
spect to aliens, the Court has traditionally held that concurrent
state law, if not preempted, must be "restricted to the narrowest of
limits .... ,,77
Treaties' interaction with federal law, including the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is less certain.7 Although it is well estab-
lished that a treaty is a contract and non-compliance with its
terms constitutes a breach, the delineation of non-compliance with
a treaty may be blurred.79
Problems arise when a nation has ratified a treaty and at-
tempts to utilize a procedure that another ratifying nation consid-
ers a form of non-compliance. The first step in resolving such a
conflict consists of analyzing the treaty itself. The Supreme Court
has held that a treaty should be interpreted beginning" 'with the
text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are
used.' "0 To determine the context of the treaty one must examine
its history, any negotiations, transcripts, and the practical con-
struction adopted by the parties.8' Several interpretations could
follow.
75. In Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982) the
Court stated:
The pre-emption doctrine, which has its roots in the Supremacy Clause,
U.S. Constitution, Article VI, clause 2, requires us to examine congressional in-
tent. Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and "is compelled whether
Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.
Id.
76. Id. at 153. Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to supersede state
law altogether may be inferred because "[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so perva-
sive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supple-
ment it," because "the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject," or because "the object ought to be obtained by the federal law and the
character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose." Id.
77. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941).
78. See Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospaciale v. United States District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2550 (1987).
79. Id. at 2550 (citing Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253
(1984)).
80. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2108, (citing Sociktk Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985))).
81. See Air France, 470 U.S. at 396 (quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S.
423, 431-32 (1943)).
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One who is engaged in treaty interpretation is concerned pri-
marily with whether the treaty's procedures by its own terms are
mandatory or optional.2 When a treaty is deemed mandatory and
exclusive, there may remain a question of whether a forum's law
falls within a treaty's scope. 83 If contracting and signatory nations
cannot resolve harmoniously that question, a treaty's force may be
irreparably weakened. Such was the case in Schlunk.
IV. A TREATY PRE-EMPTED BY THE LAW OF THE FORUM STATE
A. The Court's Reasoning
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Schlunk
Court's first determination was that compliance with Article I,"'
the relevant provision in the Hague Service Convention, is
mandatory. 5 That article provides that "[tihe present Convention
shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there
is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for ser-
82. The seminal case for interpretation of a non-exclusive treaty is SociRt6 Nationale.
In that case, the Supreme Court interpreted the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23
U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force for the United States
Oct. 7, 1972) [hereinafter "Hague Evidence Convention"] formulated by the same body that
formulated the Hague Service Convention, namely the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that "the [Hague Evidence] Conven-
tion was intended as a permissive supplement, not a preemptive replacement, for other
means of obtaining evidence located abroad." Socikt6 Nationale 107 S. Ct. at 2551. The
opinion contrasts the supplementary nature of the Hague Evidence Convention with the
mandatory nature of the Hague Convention, noting that:
The Hague Conference on Private International Law's omission of mandatory
language in the preamble is particularly significant in light of the same body's
use of mandatory language in the Preamble to the Hague Service Convention...
. As noted,... the Service Convention was drafted before the Evidence Conven-
tion, and its language provided a model exclusivity provision that the drafters of
the Evidence Convention could easily have followed had they been so inclined.
Given this background, the drafters' election to use permissive language instead
is strong evidence of their intent.
Id. at 2550-51 n.15.
For a discussion of exclusivity of the Hague Service Convention as compared to the
Hague Evidence Convention, see Oxman, supra note 74, at 758-61.
83. Three contracting nations submitted briefs supporting VWAG's position. See Reply
Brief for the Petitioner at (la-6a), Schlunk (No. 86-1052) Appendix A, Embassy of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany; Appendix B, British Embassy; and Appendix C, Ambassador de
France aux Etats-Unis.
84. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1.
85. The Court cited as authority Sociktk Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2550 n.15 (1987), and
the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2108.
HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION
vice abroad."86 The Court concluded that because the article's lan-
guage is mandatory, it "pre-empts inconsistent methods of service
prescribed by state law in all cases to which it applies.
87
It would seem to follow from that foundation that the docu-
ments in Schlunk, intended for transmittal to a party abroad,
would fall within Article I's ambit and trigger the Convention's
mandatory procedures. However, the Court determined that the
service in Schlunk was completely outside of and unaffected by the
Convention. In order to reach that conclusion, the Court scruti-
nized the term "service of process."88 Searching the negotiating
history of the Convention, it concluded that the term means ser-
vice "in the technical sense," which is determined by the law of the
forum state. 9 Thus, if the forum state does not require that docu-
ments served on a foreign defendant be transmitted abroad, the
Convention does not apply.
This contradiction highlights the flaws in the Court's reason-
ing. As the concurrence pointed out, the Court's conclusion "de-
prive[s] the Convention of any mandatory effect, for in the Court's
view the 'forum's internal law' defines conclusively whether a par-
ticular process is 'service abroad,' which is covered by the Conven-
tion, or domestic service, which is not." 90 Thus, the Court first rec-
ognized the mandatory nature of the Convention and then
effectively neutralized it. In doing so, the Court maintained that it
was not frustrating the "enabling function" of the Convention - a
statement that clearly contradicts the Court's prior acknowledge-
ment that the Convention is mandatory."
VWAG argued that allowing a state's internal law to preempt
the Convention negates one of the primary purposes of the Con-
vention: the elimination of notification au parquet.2 The Court
conceded that the Conference undoubtedly intended to eliminate
notification au parquet because it specifically included two provi-
86. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, at 362.
87. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2108.
88. Id. First, the Court concluded that "occasion to transmit" is not defined within the
Convention.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2112 (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., join,
concurring).
91. Id. at 2110.




sions in the Convention to that effect.9 3 That statement appears to
be irreconcilable with a later statement by Justice O'Connor ex-
pressing the view that those provisions do not apply unless docu-
ments must be transmitted abroad, which is a question for the fo-
rum state to answer.9
In another apparent turnaround, Justice O'Connor stated that
the Convention's final report is "somewhat equivocal" about
whether the Convention does, in fact, regulate notification au par-
quet."' Saying it would not resolve the issue in the Schlunk opin-
ion, the Court concluded that there is nothing in the negotiating
history or purposes of the Convention that would prevent a fo-
rum's internal law from dictating the sufficiency of substituted ser-
vice on a subsidiary.96 Thus, confusingly, the Court's interpretation
would appear to allow notification au parquet if a forum's internal
law allows it, even while conceding that "[t]here is no question but
that the Conference wanted to eliminate notification au
parquet.
'9 7
B. The Solicitor General's Amicus Brief
In its opinion, the Schlunk Court appeared to adopt the rea-
soning and result of the United States Solicitor General in his ami-
cus brief's5 By adopting this interpretation of the Convention, the
Court was following settled law that United States courts have the.
"final authority to interpret an international agreement for pur-
poses of applying it as law in the United States, but [the courts]
will give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive
Branch.""
One argument adopted by the Court is spelled out more com-
pletely in the Solicitor General's brief and underscores the inade-
93. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2110. The first provision requires adequate and timely notice
for the foreign defendant; the second provides for relief from an inadequate or untimely
judgment. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 1.




98. See generally United States Amicus Brief, supra note 5.
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§326(2) (1986)[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The Comment to § 326 notes that the
Supreme Court has increasingly "invited the Solicitor General to file an amicus brief giving
the views of the Executive Branch." Id. at Rep. Note 2. As amicus curiae, the Solicitor
General represents the Department of State. United States Amicus Brief, supra note 5.
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quacies in his analysis. As did the Court, 00 the Solicitor General
concluded that service of process on a wholly-owned and closely-
controlled subsidiary, such as a foreign corporation's involuntary
agent, is not service abroad within the terms of the Convention."10
Then, in a step the Court did not take, the Solicitor General sup-
ported his conclusion by analogizing notification au parquet with
the common practice of service on out-of-state defendants through
states' secretaries of state, contending that both of these practices
require service abroad.10 2 He failed, however, to explain how trans-
mission of documents to a foreign defendant through a secretary of
state should be considered service abroad, while transmission of
documents to a foreign defendant through a corporation's domestic
involuntary agent should not.
It could be asserted that substituted service on a state's secre-
tary of state does not involve an underlying relationship with the
designated party, as does substituted service on a corporation's
subsidiary. However, there is nothing in the negotiating history or
language of the Convention that expressly allows substituted ser-
vice of foreign parties through domestic channels, absent the
parties'consent.
The Court's reliance on the Solicitor General's interpretation
was unwarranted. Although, the Court may give great weight to
opinions of the executive branch, it is:
more likely to defer to an Executive interpretation previously
made in diplomatic negotiation with other countries, on the
ground that the United States should speak with one voice, than
to one adopted by the Executive in relation to a case before the
courts, especially where individual rights or interests are
involved.10'
Not only was the executive branch's potential authority in
Schlunk lessened because the Solicitor General interpreted the
Convention in relation to that case, but American courts have also
consistently held that interpretation of a treaty for purposes of a
100. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112.
101. United States Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 26. For a discussion of the Court's
analysis of this point, see supra text accompanying notes 84-91.
102. Id. at 26-27. Convention delegates stated that service under notification au par-
quet is effective when received not by the designated party but by the government official's
office; transmission to the party itself is considered "supplementary rather than necessary."
AcTs ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 22, 45-46, 49-50.
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 99, at Rep. Note 2.
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case before them is a legal, not a political, question."" Moreover,
the Court has occasionally expressed doubt about the executive in-
terpretation of agreements.' °0 Thus, the Court's reliance on the So-
licitor General's reasoning in Schlunk grants him unnecessary au-
thority in the Court's interpretation of the Hague Service
Convention.
C. The Concurrence
The concurrence, written by Justice Brennan and joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, was forcefully critical of the ma-
jority's analysis. However, in reaching the same result as the ma-
jority, the concurrence offered similar reasoning to support its
contentions.
The concurrence agreed that the Convention's provisions are
mandatory.'00 It also agreed that substituted service on a subsidi-
ary comports with the Convention's purposes."' However, Justice
Brennan disagreed that the forum's internal law should control,
writing, "I find it implausible that the Convention's framers in-
tended to leave each contracting nation, and each of the 50 States
within our Nation, free to decide for itself under what circum-
stances, if any, the Convention would control."' 08
Instead, the concurrence argued that the Illinois involuntary
agency service was valid on a substantive level.109 It acknowledged
that the Convention's negotiating history confirms that the dele-
gates intended to limit a forum state's ability to avoid the Conven-
tion's terms, thereby decreasing its effectiveness." 0 However, the
concurrence backed up its analysis with the same underlying rea-
soning as the majority: that there is nothing in the Convention's
history that expressly negates the United States long-standing
practice of allowing states to effect service on wholly-owned
subsidiaries."'
In reaching that conclusion, Justice Brennan relied on state-
104. Id. at Rep. Note 3.
105. United States v. Decker, 600 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 855
(1979); United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490 (D. N.J. 1978).
106. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112.
107. Id. at 2112-17.
108. Id. at 2112.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2116.
111. Id.
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ments made to the U.S. Senate by our Convention." 2 He did not,
however, resolve any of the contradictions. For example, one state-
ment indicated that there were no "major" changes required in
U.S. procedures in order to comply with the Convention. s An-
other stated that there should be "little change" in present proce-
dures."1 " Yet others stated that there should be no change in our
due process principles'" or law of judicial assistance.'
The concurrence merely noted and the majority completely ig-
nored another Senate comment: that compliance with the Conven-
tion would, in fact, require changes in this country's procedures.
That statement, in Justice Brennan's words, "suggest[s] that [the]
Convention may require 'a minor change in the practice of some of
our States in long-arm and automobile accident cases' where 'ser-
vice on the appropriate official need be accompanied only by a
minimum effort to notify the defendant.' "I' Presumedly, the
change in practice would require use of the Convention rather than
the substituted service of Schlunk.
V. THE IMPAIRED FORCE OF THE CONVENTION
In light of the Court's holding that the law of the forum state
prevails, the Court's repeated acknowledgment that the Conven-
tion's procedures are mandatory is puzzling, even to the Court.
The Court stated, "Thus compliance with the Convention is
mandatory in all cases to which it applies ... and Articles 15 and
16 provide an indirect sanction against those who ignore it ...
Our interpretation of the Convention does not necessarily advance
this particular objective, inasmuch as it makes recourse to the
Convention's means of service dependent on the forum's internal
112. Id. at 2112-17.
113. Id. at 2116. "In words reiterated by Secretary of State [Dean] Rusk, the delegation
observed that '[in its broadest aspects the convention makes no basic changes in U.S. prac-
tices.' S. Exec. Doc. C. at 20." Id. at n.6.
114. Id. "('The most significant aspect of the convention is the fact that it requires so
little change in the present procedures in the United States')(letter of submittal of Secre-
tary of State Rusk)." Id.
115. Id. "The delegation's head.., repeatedly observed that the Convention 'leaves our
common-law due-process principles unaffected and unchanged."' Id.
116. id. "('By our internal law .. .we already give to foreign litigants all that this
convention would require us to provide'); id. at 16 (Convention 'requires no changes in our
law of judicial assistance')." Id.
117. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2116 (citing S. ExEc. RE. No. 6, supra note 40, at 15 (state-
ment by Philip W. Amram, member of the U.S. delegation)).
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law."118 The Court rationalized this apparent contradiction by stat-
ing that "we do not think that this country, or any other country,
will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the
Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to transmit
judicial documents for service abroad."119
Thus, the Court seemed to ignore its earlier statement that
the purpose of the Convention was "to provide a simpler way to
serve process abroad, to assure that defendants sued in foreign ju-
risdictions would receive actual and timely notice of suit, and to
facilitate proof of service abroad."1 20 Perhaps the Court acted on
the notion that our country's due process standards meet even the
toughest interpretations of the Convention.1 21 Although that may
be the case, it is also possible that other counties' laws seem as
sensible to them as our laws seem to us. If other countries insist on
circumventing the Convention with their own laws, the confusion
of multiple laws will persist and defeat one of the purposes of the
Convention. And if, as the majority implies, foreign service is and
was being effected in a timely and efficient manner, the necessity
for the Convention simply does not exist. The concurrence notes:
It is perhaps heartening to "think that [no] countr[y] will draft
its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the Convention
.... The fact remains, however, that had we been content to
rely on foreign notions of fair play and substantial justice, we
would have found it unnecessary, in the first place, to partici-
pate in a Convention "to ensure that judicial ... documents to
be served abroad [would] be brought to the notice of the ad-
dressee in sufficient time.
'122
Because the Convention has proven to be a simple and effec-
tive means of serving process, 12 3 there appear to be no reasons why
the Convention should not be applied in the Schlunk context, and
the Court fails to give us any practical justification for its decision
to preempt it. In fact, Justice O'Connor acknowledges the effec-
tiveness of the Convention by urging voluntary compliance with it:
[N]othing that we say today prevents compliance with the Con-
118. Id. at 2111.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2107.
121. See Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112.
122. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2117 (citing the majority opinion, at 2111, and the Hague
Service Convention, supra note 1).
123. United States Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 9.
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vention even when the internal law of the forum does not so
require. The Convention provides simple and certain means by
which to serve process on a foreign national. Those who eschew
its procedures risk discovering that the forum's internal law re-
quired transmittal of documents for service abroad, and that the
Convention therefore provided the exclusive means of valid ser-
vice. In addition, parties that comply with the Convention ulti-
mately may find it easier to enforce their judgments abroad.""
In addition to impairing the efficiency and certainty of process
served abroad, the Court's decision also defeats the timeliness. Al-
though U.S. citizens may view the Convention's procedures as
somewhat more time-consuming than service on a domestic subsid-
iary, the decision's effect is to create more confusion and suggests
that each party to the Convention, plus each state within the
United States, may decide when and if the Convention applies.12
The concurrence, while acknowledging the depleted force of the
Convention in light of the majority's decision, 126 gives us a "sub-
stantive" guideline that has no more practical application for for-
eign countries than does the majority's.
127
Neither the majority nor concurrence, while discussing the ne-
gotiating history and delegates' Senate statements, gave any
weight to the fact that five nations who are parties to the Conven-
tion submitted amicus curiae briefs supporting VWAG.12s Those
briefs urged that the intent and mandatory nature of the Conven-
tion demand that the Convention's procedures override inconsis-
tent state laws allowing substituted service of process on foreign
124. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2111. The Court refers to Westin, Enforcing Foreign Com-
mercial Judgments and Arbitral Awards in the United States, West Germany, and Eng-
land, LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 325, 340-41 (1987).
125. This sentiment was reflected in Justice Brennan's concurrence. See supra text ac-
companying note 108.
126. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2117. "[W]hile other nations are not bound by the Court's
pronouncement that the Convention lacks obligatory force, after today's decision their
courts will surely sympathize little with any United States national pleading that a judg-
ment violates the Convention because (notwithstanding any local characterization) service
was 'abroad'." Id.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 106-17.
128. Thus, the Court turned its back on the policy of rejecting interpretations that
"would fail to effect any purpose of the Convention's framers," as articulated in Trans
World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 255 (1984). Although the Solicitor
General stated that the United States, as a party to the Convention, has a "vital sovereign
interest in assuring that the Convention is construed in accordance with its terms and the
intent of the contracting nations, including the United States," he does not discuss the in-
terpretation given the Convention by other contracting nations in their amicus briefs.
United States Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 1.
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corporations. "2 9 The nations emphasized that allowing inconsistent
state laws to pre-empt the Convention would reinstate the confu-
sion which existed prior to the enactment of the Convention.30
Although the Schlunk Court cited the long-standing rule of
liberal treaty construction, its reasoning ignored it.' VWAG ar-
gued that "[i]t is particularly inappropriate to elevate the policies
of local law - which frequently strike a balance different from
that which applies in the international context - over the provi-
sions of a federal treaty governing international service of pro-
cess."1 2 Traditionally, the Court has upheld that line of reasoning,
urging extreme caution in extending state or national legal con-
cepts over international law. 33 Further, the fundamental doctrine
of pacta sunt servanda requires that "international obligations
129. Petitioner Reply Brief supra note 6 at la-15a. Countries submitting amicus curiae
briefs for VWAG were: the Federal Republic of Germany, id. at la ("The decision of the
Appellate Court of Illinois is in conflict with the letter and the spirit of the Convention and
ignores its mandatory character."); Great Britain, id. at 3a ("By labelling a domestic subsid-
iary of the German corporation concerned as an involuntary agent for service, the State
Court avoided compliance with the provisions of the (Hague Service Convention]."); France,
id. at 7a-8a ("The decision of the Court of this state in practice amounts to rendering inef-
fective the procedures established by the Convention and deprives the Convention of its
uniform character for the contracting parties which was intended by the drafters of the
Convention and which has been ratified by the Signatories."); Japan, id. at 9a ("... the role
played by the Hague Service Convention on both simplification for service and the protec-
tion for the person to be served should be duly evaluated and that the domestic procedures
which will impair the intentions of the Convention are undesirable."); and Belgium, id. at
15a ("... if it proves to be correct that the document commencing the action, destined for
the defendant, was served only on its American subsidiary which was not concerned except
inasmuch as it was an 'involuntary agent' in this case, the Belgian government considers
such a practice to be contrary to an application conforming to the above-mentioned
Convention.").
130. Notably, no Convention parties submitted amicus briefs supporting the service in
Schlunk, although the U.S. Solicitor-General's brief advanced the proposition that the Con-
vention is primarily an enabler to be used when a forum state determines that there is
occasion to serve process abroad. United States Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 12, 13.
131. "'Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements .... ' Schlunk,
108 S. Ct. at 2108 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396) (1985). Moreover, if a
"treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the rights which may be claimed
under it, and the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred." Factor
v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-294 (1933).
132. Brief for the Petitioner at 24, Schlunk (No. 86-1052).
133. See generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 107 S. Ct.
1026, 1034 (1987) ("Itlhe unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a
foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness" of over-
extending American jurisdiction.); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31, 233
(1942)("[S]tate law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provi-
sions of, a treaty or of an international compact or agreement .... No State can rewrite our
foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies.").
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survive any restrictions in domestic law.' 13 4
The Court has also traditionally recognized the importance of
giving "considerable weight" to opinions of sister signatories. 8 5
However, the Schlunk Court did not discuss the amicus briefs of
the five contracting nations that supported VWAG's position.
Those nations were emphatic in their contention that the Conven-
tion compels compliance. The Federal Republic of Germany, not-
ing that the Court's position would be both unproductive and
costly, stated that it also "would eviscerate the Hague Service Con-
vention and throw its signatories back to the confusion existing
prior to its ratification."' 3 Great Britain claimed that allowing ser-
vice on a foreign corporation's subsidiary "avoid[s] compliance
with the provisions of the Hague Convention .... ,",a France con-
tended that "[a]part from the legal arguments which support the
exclusivity of the Convention, it is therefore in the interest of the
contracting parties to avoid impairment of the principle of the uni-
formity of its application."13 8 In ignoring its sister signatories, the
United States has in reality only superficially fulfilled its avowed
purpose to carefully examine the Convention's intent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Schlunk severely reduces the
effectiveness of the Hague Service Convention. Foreign defendants
may no longer rely on our compliance with the Convention and,
therefore, may be able to dispute any default judgment entered
against them as a result of the application of our internal law.
Moreover, if other parties to the Convention follow the Court's
reasoning and circumvent the Convention whenever their internal
law allows, the Convention's power to enforce judgments against
foreign defendants, and to protect defendants from faulty default
judgments, will be lost. As France, a contracting nation, noted, the
Schlunk decision will result in a "legal situation... similar to that
existing prior to the Hague Convention, leading to procedural con-
fusions, delays in execution, and costs to the detriment of Ameri-
134. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 99 at § 321, Comment a.
135. Air France, 470 U.S. at 404 (citing Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572
F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979)).
136. Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 6, at 2a.
137. Id. at 3a.
138. Id. at 13a.
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can as well as foreign companies."139 Although the Schlunk major-
ity stated that nations would never deliberately change their laws
to circumvent the Convention, the fact remains that laws do exist
that made the Convention necessary in the first place.
It is well established that if a treaty or convention is consid-
ered mandatory, as is the Hague Service Convention, failure to
comply with its procedures constitutes a breach. Other signatories
consider the Schlunk holding to be in defiance of the Convention.
The decision therefore not only brings confusion to the order that
the Convention sought to establish in international service of pro-
cess, but also damages the United States long-standing philosophy
of deferring to international treaties.
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139. Id. at 8a.
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